

## Message Text

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47

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 IO-10 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 AID-05 /076 W

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O R 011135Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9856

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 5820

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MILI, VS, JA

SUBJECT: GOJ'S REACTION TO SURRENDER OF SAIGON

REF: TOKYO 5819

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

SUMMARY. SHOCKED BY SURRENDER OF SAIGON, FONOFF SENIOR OFFICIALS

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CAUTIOUS ABOUT PROCEEDING INTO NEW POLICIES ALTHOUGH PRG  
ADMINISTRATION IN SAIGON WILL PROBABLY BE RECOGNIZED FAIRLY  
QUICKLY. REFLECTING ON EVENTS IN SVN, BOTH FONMIN AND VICE  
FONMIN SHOW APPRECIATION FOR INTENTIONS OF US, DESPITE ULTIMATE

OUTCOME, AND BOTH TIE JAPAN'S FUTURE COURSE CLOSE TO US.  
IN PRESS BACKGROUNDER AND TV PRESS CONFERENCE FONMIN TOLD  
JOURNALISTS JAPAN HAD COOPERATED WITH US IN INDOCHINA AND ALTHOUGH US  
OCCASIONALLY MAY HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH INSUFFICIENCY  
OF JAPAN'S EFFORTS, GOJ HAD DONE ALL POSSIBLE UNDER JAPAN'S  
CONSTITUTION AND SYSTEM TO HELP. EMD SUMMARY.

1. OFFICIAL GOJ REACTION TO SAIGON'S SURRENDER GIVEN PRESS  
IN BACKGROUNDER AND IN TV PRESS CONFERENCE APRIL 30 BY FONMIN  
MIYAZAWA. ALTHOUGH CLEARLY SHOCKED BY SUDDEN SURRENDER,  
HIS COMMENTS WERE MARKED BY DEEP SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING OF  
AMERICAN OBJECTIVES IN INDOCHINA. MIYAZAWA TOLD JOURNALIST, "US, WITH  
GOOD FAITH, SENT ARMED FORCES TO SVN, WITH INTENTION OF HELPING  
SVN ESTABLISH DEMOCRACY." ADDING THAT US LOST 55,000 MEN  
THERE, FONMIN SAID THAT EVEN TODAY US INTENTIONS COULD  
NOT BE SAID TO BE WICKED, BUT ULTIMATELY LOFTY AMERICAN  
OBJECTIVES WERE NOT COMPATIBLE WITH VIETNAMESE ENVIRONMENT.  
RETURNING TO ROOTS OF INDOCHINA PROBLEM, MIZAWA SAID DIVISION OF  
VN INTO DEMOCRATIC AND COMMUNIST SIDES RESULTED IN SVN  
INCLUDING "RELICS OF COLONIALISM" WHICH STOOD AGAINST NATIONAL  
INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT.  
ALTHOUGH US DID NOT ORIGINALLY INTEND TO INTERVENE IN DOMESTIC  
VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS, INFORTUNATELY, RESULT WAS INTERVENTION.

2. MIYAZAWA SAID THAT IN INDOCHINA GOJ COOPERATED WITHIN SCOPE  
OF JAPAN'S CONSTITUTION AND NATIONAL SENTIMENT." HE WAS QUOTED  
AS SAYING FURTHER, "FROM US VIEW, JAPAN'S COOPERATION MAY HAVE  
BEEN INSUFFICIENT AND UNSATISFACTORY, BUT JAPAN HAS COOPERATED  
AS BEST IT COULD WITHIN RESTRICTIONS OF JAPAN'S SYSTEM."

3. MIYAWAWA ALSO TOLD JOURNALIST GOJ WOULD RECOGNIZE  
PRG IN SAIGON WHEN THE NEW ADMISTRATION ESTABLISHED  
EFFECTIVE RULE.

4. JOURNALIST FRIEND (YOMIURI), WHO ATTENDED MIYAZAWA'S  
BACKGROUNDER, TOLD US FONMIN WAS FAR MORE CAUTIOUS ON INDOCHINA  
THAN HE WAS THREE WEEKS AGO BEFORE HIS TRIP TO US. AT THAT TIME,  
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MIYAZAWA SPOKE PUBLICLY OF "ASIAN SOLUTIONS" AND "SELF  
DETERMINATION" IN INDOCHINA BUT TONE YESTERDAY WAS ROOTED IN STRONG  
TIES WITH US.

5. IN SEPARATE BACKGROUNDER YESTERDAY WITH VICE FONMIN TOGO,  
SAME JOURNALIST RELAYED TO US TOGO'S COMMENTS AS FOLLOWS:  
"JAPAN HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO FOLLOW THE US FROM THE FIRST".  
OUR JOURNALIST FRIEND CONCLUDED THAT TOGO MEANT JAPAN WAS WEAK  
AND, THEREFORE MUST CLING TO US POWER. US POLICY WAS RIGHT AND  
WE GUESS HE MEANT AS AMERICA'S ALLY, THERE WAS NO CHOICE BUT FOR  
US AND JAPAN TO PURSUE MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE POLICIES IN INDOCHINA.  
URGED BY JOURNALISTS TO PURSUE POLICIES INDEPENDENT OF US,  
TOGO ANSWERED, "POLITICAL MAP OF ASIA IS BEING REDRAWN AND JAPAN

SHOULD WATCH THE EMERGING DESIGN. JAPAN HAS TIME AND NEED NOT RUSH." TOGO ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT TIES WITH US REMAINED PARAMOUNT. OUR JOURNALIST FRIEND ALSO RECALLED THAT IN CONVERSATION WITH TOGO THREE WEEKS AGO, TOGO LABELED MIYAZAWA'S IDEAS ON INDOCHINA, "IDEALISTIC." NOW, ACCORDING TO FRIEND, THE TWO VIEW THE SITUATION IN THE SAME WAY, IS TO STRENGTHEN TIES WITH US.

6. AS FOR IMMEDIATE AFFECTS OF SAIGON'S SURRENDER, FONOFF FIRST SE ASIA DIVDIR HANSBUSA TOLD EMBASSY MAY 1 THAT UNEXPECTED STRANDING OF JAPANESE DIPLOMATS IN SAIGON MAY FORCE GOJ TO ACT SOONER THAN HAD BEEN HOPED TO RECOGNIZE PRG ADMINISTRATION. FONOFF INSTRUCTED GOJ AMB IN VIENTIENE TO CONTACT DRV EMBASSY TO "DEMAND PROTECTION OF JAPANESE CITIZENS STRANDED IN SAIGON." JAPANESE EMBASSY IN SAIGON IS ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT PRG REPS DIRECTLY TO SECURE GURANTEES FOR JAPANESE PROTECTION. IN COURSE THOSE TALKS, HANABUSA EXPECTS PRG TO MAKE FORCEFUL PUSH FOR RECOGNITION, TO WHICH GOJ MAY HAVE TO ACCEDE.

7. HANABUSA SAID HIS REPORTS EARLIER MAY 1 INDICATED SAIGON WAS QUIET, AND THERE HAD BEEN NO HARRASSMENT OF JAPANESE OR OTHER DIPLOMATS. SHOULD QUIET CONTINUE, AND IF PRG ALLOWS, JAPAN'S EMBASSY MIGHT SIMPLY REMAIN IN PLACE.

8. COMMENT: SINCE MIYAZAWA'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, GOJ AND LDP HAVE MOVED SURELY TOWARD STRENGTHENING TIES WITH US, A PROCESS WHICH FONOFF AND LDP ELDERS EXPECT TO CONTINUE WITH PM MIKI'S VISIT. IN MARKED CONTRAST, AS REPORTED REFTEL, PRESS AND OPPOSITION CONFIDENTIAL

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FAVOR FOREIGN POLICY LINES INDEPENDENT OF US. WHILE, AS TOGO SAID, IT IS TOO EARLY TO SORT OUT ASIA'S FUTURE, MIYAZAWA'S WARM AND REASSURING WORDS FOR US INTENTIONS REPRESENT CURRENT THRUST OF GOJ POSTURE. BUT KIND WORDS ASIDE, IN NUMEROUS CONVERSATIONS WITH ALL LEVELS FONOFF OFFICIALS FOCUS IS ON US CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD ROK AND WHAT POLICIES USG CAN PURSUE IN LIGHT OF THOSE ATTITUDES. HODGSON

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